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THE APPEARANCE OF RIGHT AND THE ESSENCE
OF WRONG: METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN LAW
Jeanne L. Schroeder* and David Gray Carlson**

INTRODUCTION:
RIGHT AND WRONG; ESSENCE AND APPEARANCE

In the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel identifies right
with essence and wrong with mere appearance.
The principle of Tightness, the universal will, receives its essential
determinate character through the particular will, and so stands in
relation to something inessential. This is the relation of essence to its
appearance ... In wrong however, appearance proceeds to become
mere semblance or show. A semblance is a determinate existence
inappropriate to the essence, namely an empty detachment and
positing of the essence, as the power and authority over the
semblance. The essence has negated that which negated it, and is
thereby confirmed. Wrong is a semblance of this kind, and through
its disappearance, right acquires the determination of something
fixed and valid.'

At first reading this passage seems to express a concept that is
refreshingly simple and intuitive—at least by Hegelian standards.
According to the common colloquial understanding, essence is the
deeper truth of appearance. It is "what is permanent and enduring in
things."^ Essence is what is left when one strips away the inessential.
Appearance, in contrast, is fleeting and false. Wrong is likewise an
error, a subjective, temporary mistake that is doomed to pass away.
Putting these two definitions together, Hegel seems to be saying that
right will be achieved when wrong passes away; by implication, one
* Professor of Law, the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New
York City.
** Professor of Law, the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New
York City.
1 G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 87 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.
B. Nisbet trans., 1991) [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].

2 ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, HEGEL'S ETHICS OF RECOGNITION 156 (1997).
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should hasten this process by clearing the underbrush of wrong in order
to reveal the right that otherwise would be obscured. Even such an
eminent Hegel scholar as R.C. Williams has interpreted this passage in
this way.3
To a reader of Hegel's Science of Logic,^ however, this
interpretation is troublesome. It would seem to make Hegel into a
Kantian who distinguishes between an inessential, contingent and
empirical phenomenon (wrong) and an essential, eternal and intelligible
noumenon (right). In the Logic, however, Hegel completely rejects this
aspect of Kant's metaphysics and develops a theory of essence and
appearance that is totally diverse from (and yet the deeper truth of)
everyday notions. The payoff to Hegel's discussion of essence and
appearance is that there is no mystical beyond of appearance. Essence
is appearance, and essenee always appears. The law of appearance is
that it always Jwappears. He portrays essence as that which cannot be
named. Yet, in the above passage, essence seems to have been given a
name—aright.
One might be tempted to argue that Hegel was just using the terms
differently in these two different books. Since Hegel's focus in the
Philosophy of Right was on jurisprudential and political theory, as
opposed to metaphysics, he thought it sufficient to use colloquial, rather
than technical, definitions of essence and appearance. The problem
with this approach is that Hegel's philosophy is famously, or
infamously, totalizing. Each of his books is designed as an integral part
of a single internally consistent whole. Each sheds light on all of the
others and none can be completely understood in isolation.
Moreover, the Philosophy of Right was written after the Logic and
its discussion of wrong frequently assumes familiarity with Hegel's
unique terminology developed in the Logic.^ Furthermore, in his
discussion of morality in the second part of the Philosophy of Right,
Hegel expressly criticizes Kant's moral theory for its dependence upon
the phenomenon-noumenon distinction.^ The question therefore arises
as to how one can interpret Hegel's theory of the relationship between
right and wrong set forth in Philosophy of Right consistently with his
imderstanding of essenee and appearance explicated in the Logic.
We believe that, Hegel can best be understood by looking back to
Kant and forward to Lacan. Hegel is Kant's most vociferous critic and,
as such, his most faithful student. Consequently, one of the best ways of

3 Id.
4 G. W. F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC (A. V. Miller trans., 1969) [hereinafter

HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC].

3 For an example, see section 95, where Hegel refers to crime as a "negative infinite
judgment." HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, 5«pra note l,at 121.
6 Id. at 162-63.
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understanding Hegel is use Kant as a starting place and then study how
Hegel diverged from his predecessor. Lacan's ethical theory, in turn,
can be seen as a re-examination of Kant through a Hegelian prism.
In this essay, we argue against the notion that right is a body of
legal doctrines that remain once wrongs have been erased. Rather, we
wish to argue that what Hegel means in the above passage is that right is
indeterminate without wrong. Without wrong, right could never be
perceived. Right can only be understood as the negation of wrong.
Right has no more affirmative meaning than this.
But what is wrong? It is simply the negative of right, and no more
than this. Neither has any content on its own. There can be no question
of erasing all the wrongs to reveal a collection of rights. If all the
wrongs are erased, right itself is erased as well.
How can wrong be the negative of right if both essence and
appearance, are, in fact, appearance? The answer is that wrong is
appearance as "semblance" or appearance posing as essence. That is,
wrong is the contingent, particular and subjective posing as necessary,
universal and objective. Wrong is the very claim to presence, in the
Derridean sense. Right, in contrast, is the very dissolution of
presence—the understanding that nothing "is" but was and will be.
Right is, therefore, not what is left over when wrong is revealed to be
mere semblance. It is the process of wrong vanishing. Right is not a
fact, but an act.
Because right is the dissolution of wrong, right depends on wrong.
If all wrong were to be eliminated, "right and wrong—Between whose
endless jar justice resides Should lose their names, and so should justice
too."^ Yet, ironically, it is the very naming of right that is wrong. That
matter can be put this way. Wrong is the naming of right. It is
metaphor—a claim to have captured right in some static way.
Dissolution of metaphor is right. Right can never be named and so it
can only be known metonymically. Metonymy—the inability to name
the thing but only to describe the context in which the thing appears—is
the trope appropriate to right.
This dialectic of right and wrong, between whose endless jar
justice resides, reflects a single paradox at the heart of Hegelian legal
philosophy, Kantian ethical thought, Lacanian psychoanalytical theory
and, indeed. Christian theology. St. Augustine called the dialectic
Original Sin. To Kant, it was Radical Evil. To Lacan, the sexual
impasse. Every attempt by fallen man to act rightfully is always a
failure. Right is always smeared with wrong. But it is this very failure
to achieve right calls right into being. Wrong is the precondition of
(and always precedes) right.
6 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Troilus and Cressida, in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE act 1, sc. 3 (1909).
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Such a reading reconciles Hegel's Science of Logic with his
remarks about right and wrong in the Philosophy of Right. Furthermore,
Hegel's analysis of right as essence and wrong as appearance looks
forward to the Lacanian concepts of the masculine and feminine,
metaphor and metonymy. Like the Lacanian feminine, right is never
present. Wrong is the masculine position. The masculine insists upon
presence; he claims to be totally constrained by the law. This is
semblance: the false claim that law is not appearance (contingent,
particular and subjective) but essence (necessary, universal and
objective). In Lacanian terms, wrong is a denial that law is only
symbolic. It is the delusion that law is real. The masculine position
requires the feminine because he can only maintain his position by
repressing the feminine as that which would disprove the masculine
claim of universal law. This exclusion of the feminine, however,
actually brings her into being, as the feminine is understood as precisely
that which has been excluded. In the same way, right can only "appear"
as that which wrong has heretofore tried to foreclose.
This essay constitutes another installment in our ongoing project of
developing a Hegelian-Lacanian jurisprudence. In pursuit of this
project. Part I of this paper briefly describes Hegel's mysterious theory
of essence in the Science of Logic. In Part II, we explore Kant's theory
of the relationship between the moral law and radical evil which is a
precursor to Hegel's jurisprudential philosophy. In Part III, aided by
our understanding of Kant we return to Hegel and discuss his theory of
right and crime, in order to show how the quotation that opens this
essay is illuminated by the Science of Logic. Finally, we introduce
Lacanian concepts of feminine metonymy and masculine metaphor and
apply them to respectively to the positions of unnameable right and
imperialistic wrong as another step in the development of a Lacanian
jurisprudence.
,

I.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC

In the Philosophy of Right, right is essence, wrong is appearance.
But this does not mean that right is something positive. In fact,
positivization of essence is precisely the view that Hegel denounces in
the Science of Logic.
By way of quick introduction, Hegel conceived of the Science of
Logic as the principal work upon which all other work was based. The
Phenomenology of Spirit, in contrast, is merely an introduction to the
Science of Logic—it shows consciousness to be an inadequate ground
for philosophy, thereby setting the stage for the Science of Logic.
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Arguably, these are the only two hooks Hegel wrote. Everything else
(such as the Philosophy of Right) are lectures, or student guides to
lectures.
Each section of the Science of Logic proceeds according to a threepart process.
First, the "understanding" makes an "immediate"
proposition. Dialectical reason then points out that the understanding
has suppressed its own history in mediation. Dialectical reason sees
"double"—the immediacy together with the suppressed history of
mediation. By emphasizing mediation instead of immediacy, dialectical
reason negates immediacy. Speculative reason is able to think
immediacy and mediation/negation together.
In the Science of Logic, the doctrine of being corresponds with the
understanding. It stands for one-sided immediacy. Its fate, however, is
to go under; it cannot endure, because it is irretrievably mediated by
nothingness. Nothingness is the truth of being. That is to say, being is
"finite"; its death constitutes its being as much as its life. Non-being is
the secret code of being. When its implicit core—its "in-itself—
becomes "for-itself," then being has negated itself.
Essence stands for dialectical reason—immediacy negated.
Because essence is dialectical, there are two things true of it. First of
all, it is a negation of being and hence a mediated idea. That is, there is
being and its negation. Second, because essence is mediated by being
(and vice versa), essence depends on being, for without being, essence
would have nothing to negate.
Being, therefore, is the stuff of essence. When essence negates
being, essence negates itself. It says, in effect, "I am not that. I was
being, but being is dead and in the past. Now I am, and what I am is not
that." This is all essence is—it is not being, just as right simply is the
negation of wrong. Paradoxically essence is when it announces what it
is not. This is very paradoxical, but it is a paradox inherent in the
common sense notion of negation. Suppose we say that "not x" is the
negation of x. It is wrong to think of "not x" as nothing. "Not x" has
affirmative being. It is a fundamental precept of Hegel that "nothing is,
after all, something."^
Essence, then, is not a thing—a being. It is a process. It is the act
of the thing vanishing. If we take being as appearance, essence appears
when appearance disappears. When this act of negating occurs, essence
is actual. Essence is as essence does.
For present purposes, then, there are two lessons to be drawn from
the doctrine of essence; (1) Essence is a process—an act, not a thing, (2)
Because essence is the negation of being, essence is in correlation with
being; it is what it is not.
8 David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quality, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 437 (2001).
[hereinafter Carlson, Quality],
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Hegel eompares this view of essenee with a false view, in which
essence is positivized into something unmediated. According to this
false view, essence is "the indeterminate, simple unity from which what
is determinate has been eliminated in an external manner."^ According
to this false view, appearance ("what is determinate") is subjectively
wished away ("eliminated in an external manner"). Appearance does
not destroy (or sublate) itself but is subjectively negated. What is left
standing is some affirmative thing falsely supposed to be essence. In
Kantian philosophy, this essence is forever beyond our knowledge.
According to Kant, we can only know the phenomena—never the thingin-itself.
To Hegel, the Kantian thing-in-itself is simply another appearance.
Only when this appearance disappears is essence actualized. For this
reason, with Hegel it is appearance all the way down."' Any attempt to
establish essenee as a transcendental "thing" is simply trafficking in yet
more appearances. It is the process of appearance's self-negation that is
essenee as such.
In other words, essence can only be actualized through, and as,
mere appearance—its very negation. And what is the enduring truth
that essence announces when it appears? "I am not essence. I am mere
appearance, and 1 shall pass away." Appearance is false or a semblance
only insofar as it pretends that it, or anything, can endure as is.
The false "Kantian" view of essence—^that essence is a selfidentical immediacy—is also the false view of right. According to this
false view, right is what is left standing when all wrong has been pruned
away. This is precisely what Hegel is not saying in the Philosophy of
Right. But in order better to see how Hegel's analysis of right and
wrong reflects the foregoing account of essence and appearance, we
must first consider Kant's moral theory.
Hegel's jurisprudence is largely a response to Kant's moral theory.
Consequently, we can acquire a better understanding of Hegel's project
9 HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 4, at 389.
'0 &e 1 JEAN HYPPOLITE, FIGURES DE LA PENSEE PHILOSOPHIQUE (1971). Hyppolite asserts
that:
Hegelian philosophy rejects all transcendence. It is the attempt at a rigorous philosophy
that could claim to remain within the immanent, and not to leave it. There is no other
world, no thing in itself, no transcendence, and yet finite human thought is not
condemned to remain a prisoner of its finitude. It surmounts itself, and what it reveals
or manifests is being itself.

ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL'S IDEALISM: THE SATISFACTIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 206
(1989) (explaining that "the major point of this section is to argue that there is literally nothing
'beyond' or 'behind' or responsible for the human experience of the world of appearances, and
certainly not an Absolute Spirit"). Pippen's formulation, however, must be corrected slightly.
There is an Absolute Spirit, but it does not lie "beyond" or "behind." It renders itself explicit,
through the Logic. In any case. Pippin properly sees Hegel as accepting the skeptical critique:
"there are no 'essences'" beyond or behind the appearances, at least none that can do any
cognitive work. There are just the appearances ...." Id. ai 111.
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by considering both what Hegel rejected—much of Kant's metaphysical
framework—and what he adopted and reinterpreted—Kant's insight
that there is a foundational paradoxical relationship between reason and
wrong.
II.

KANTIAN RADICAL EVIL

Hegel differs in many fundamental ways from Kant's moral
philosophy as set forth in his three Critiques, his Metaphysics of Morals
and his later and lesser known Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason. Most obviously, Hegel divides what Kant considered a single
category of morality into three: the more primitive realm of right, which
has been our concern up to this time, then morality and finally ethics.
Consequently, some of the concerns that Kant raises in his consideration
of moral law, which we discuss in this section, are not considered by
Hegel in his chapter on right. Nevertheless, the fundamental paradox
that Kant identified in the moral law looks forward to Hegel's analysis
of the necessary interrelationship between right and wrong, as well as
the later necessaiy interrelationship between morality and evil.
A.

Kantian Metaphysics

1. Noumena and Phenomena. As emphasized earlier, Kant's
moral philosophy relies heavily on a distinction between the thing-initself (or noumenon) and the phenomenon. Roughly speaking, the
phenomenon is the fleeting, contingent empirical and sensible world of
our experience; the noumenon, or "thing-in-itself," is the eternal,
unchanging, essential or intelligible world of which we have no
experience. Kant posits that there is a necessary relationship between
phenomena and noumena. "If.. . phenomena are held to be, as they are
in fact, nothing more than mere representations connected with each
other in accordance with empirical laws, they must have a ground which
is not phenomenal."" Indeed, he thinks that this is definitional.
Because Kant defines phenomena as mere appearance, they must
represent something else which is not a mere appearance. Otherwise, a
phenomenon is not the representation but the actual thing. As we shall
see, Hegel argues that Kant's thing-in-itself is just another phenomenon,
at the same level as other phenomena. Essence is not opposed to
appearance, but is the unending chain of appearances.
" IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 302 (J. M. D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990)
[hereinafter KANT, PURE REASON],
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Hegel will nevertheless adopt Kant's starting proposition that
rationality, freedom and spontaneity are, if not identical, so closely
interrelated that one cannot conceive of one without the others.
However, because Hegel rejects Kant's notion of the noumenon, he will
also draw different conclusions from this proposition. Kant thinks that
the existence of freedom—^which is noumenal—in the phenomenal
world is problematic.therefore, struggle with the question as
to whether freedom is even possible. In contrast, Hegel will argue that
freedom in the empirical world is not merely possible or actual, but
necessary—required by the internal logic of the individual as free will.
2. Transcendental and Practical Freedom. Kant first raises the
issue of freedom in his discussion of the third of the four famous
antinomies.The dogmatic thesis is "Causality according to the laws
of nature is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena
of the world. A causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully
for these phenomena."'"* The empirical antithesis is "There is no such
thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens solely according
to the laws of nature."'^ The issue at stake here is "whether 1 am a free
agent, or, like other beings, am bound in the chains of nature and
fate."i6
Causation v. freedom is one of the two so-called "dynamical"
antinomies. This means that it can be resolved by showing that the
thesis and the antithesis do not, in fact, contradict each other but are true
at different levels of abstraction."* Kant agrees with the thesis in the
sense that all empirical phenomena have causes, but this leaves open the
possibility that noumena could be uncaused. This would, at first glance,
imply that freedom could only be purely transcendental, existing only as
a noumenon {i.e., contradicting the antithesis). But one must not forget
12 "Problematic" is a quintessential Kantian term. What is problematic is merely thinkable or
possible, not necessarily existent. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 161
(T. K. Abbott trans., 1996) [hereinafter KANT, PRACTICAL REASON].
13 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant struggles to formulate an argument as to how freedom
might be at least theoretically possible in the empirical world. In his Critique of Practical Reason
Kant tries to go further and proposes that we have good reason to believe that empirical freedom
does exist.
1^ KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 11, at 252.
15 Id.
1® Id. at 263. The questions raised by the other three antinomies are:
whether the world has a beginning and a limit to its extension in space; whether there
exists anywhere, or perhaps, in my own thinking Self an indivisible and indestructible
unity—or whether nothing but what is divisible and transitory exists;. . . whether,
finally, there is a supreme cause of the world, or all our thought and speculation must
end with nature and the order of extemal things.
Id.
12 See KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 12, at 127. In contrast, Kant resolves the
"mathematical" antinomies by showing that neither the thesis nor antithesis is true.
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the necessary relationship that phenomena bear to noumena. Although
all phenomena have causes, the fact that phenomena always reflect
noumena means that the cause of a phenomenon does not itself have to
be phenomenal but could be noumenal. It is, therefore, theoretically
possible that transcendental freedom could manifest itself-—or in Kant's
terminology, become "practical"—in the phenomenal world.
Human beings, being both intelligible and sensible creatures, are
both noumenal and phenomenal.
The noumenal aspect of man is
reason. Consequently, if reason can cause phenomenal human action,
then practical freedom is more than the mere negative freedom to slip
loose from the causal chains of nature. There could be a positive (or
practical) aspect of freedom as the spontaneous uncaused cause of
action in the world.
B.

Kantian Morality

Kant's theory of morality relies on a distinction between maxims
and laws. Because man is intelligible and not merely sensible, he acts
out of will, not out of instinct like an animal. Animals have no choice
but to follow their inclinations, but a man gives in to his inclinations
only because he has chosen to do so. The general pattern by which man
surrenders to inclination is described by a person's "maxims." Maxims
are subjective to specific persons, and are, therefore, empirical, sensible
and particular—^phenomenal. Moral laws, in contrast, are objective,
transcendental intelligible and universal—noumenal. Virtue consists in
adopting maxims that conform with the moral law. This leads to the
"categorical imperative," or moral law as universality:
Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold
good as a principle of universal legislation.^''
That which is empirical is particular. Consequently, empiricism
makes it impossible for any specific positive law to be Law {i.e..
KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 11, at 307. As Kant states: "He is thus to himself, on the
one hand, a phenomenon, but on the other hand in respect of certain faculties, a purely intelligible
object—intelligible, because its actions cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. These
faculties are understanding and reason." Id.
19 Therefore, "the volition of every man has an empirical character, which is nothing more
than the causality of his reason." Id. at 309.
20 See KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 12, at 46. See also IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 17 (Mary Gregor trans. & ed., 1996) [hereinafter KANT, MORALS].
Probably lesser known is the categorical imperative expressed as the principal of humanity set
forth in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals'. "Act in accordance with a maxim of ends
that it ean be a universal law for everyone." Quoted in Roger J. Sullivan, Introduction to KANT,
MORALS, supra at xviii.
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universal). Positive law is phenomenal. The true moral law is
noumenal—intelligible not sensible. This means that moral law cannot
be discovered by experience but must be deduced by reason.^' As a
noumenon moral law must be independent from natural causality. This
implies that ''''freedom in the strictest, that is in the transcendental sense
[is] a will which can have its law in nothing but the mere legislative
form of the maxim is a free will."^^
Kant concludes with the seeming paradox that freedom requires
law, and vice versa. "[Fjreedom and an unconditional practical law
reciprocally imply each other.In other words, law must be
spontaneously created. It must be legislated by reason. This raises a
paradox: how can law be universal and objective if each rational person
self-legislates her own law?
1. The Right and the Good. Kant famously claims to reconcile
the universal with the particular (i.e., how is it that everyone is a
legislator of a universal law?) by distinguishing right (moral law, the
"ought") from the good (that which is substantively, or empirically
beneficial). Kant's distinction is, however, quite different from the
distinction that Hegel will draw between right and morality. As we
discuss below, Hegel argues that right is more primitive than morality.
Mere legal right is enforced through external coercion whereas morality
is an internalized sense of obligation. The necessary dialectical
relationship between right and wrong, on the one hand, and morality
and evil, on the other, are forms of a necessary relationship that reflect
the relation of essence and appearance.
In contrast, Kant identifies right with morality, and grounds the
distinction between right and the good on the distinction between the
noumenon and the phenomenon. The good is that which is beneficial as
an empirical matter and, therefore, phenomenal. This implies that right
can have no substantive content because content is phenomenal. The
test of whether something is right (i.e., is moral and law) is, therefore,
purely formal.^'' This formal test is the famous categorical imperative.
Of course, Kant completely recognizes that in ordinary life.
21

Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason, and is, therefore, not
an object of the senses, and consequently, does not belong to the class of phenomena, it
follows that the idea of it, which determines the will, is distinct from all the principles
that determine events in nature according to the law of causality, because in their case
the determining principles must themselves be phenomena.
KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 12, at 43,
22 Id.
23 Id. at 44.
2'' "[N]othing is contained in [the matter of the law] except the legislative form. It is the
legislative form, then, contained in the maxim, which can alone constitute a principle of
determination of the [free] will." Id. at 44.
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maxims and positive laws must have ,substantive content. Many of
these may very well be good, but good is empirical, and therefore
merely contingent, not moral. To be moral, a "good" rule must be
justified by something more profound than beneficial consequences—
i.e., it must meet the formal test of universality that characterizes the
noumena.
2, The Moral Law and Radical Evil. We now come to the aspect
of Kantian moral philosophy that will inspire Hegel's theory of wrong
and
Lacan's
psychoanalysis—the
fundamental
unresolvable
contradiction between morality and evil that constitutes the human
condition. This tension is the foundation of human freedom.
To repeat, Kant distinguishes between morality—which is purely
objective formal and abstract—and the good—^which is subjective,
substantive, concrete and (in Kant's terminology) "pathological." The
problem is, as we discuss extensively elsewhere,^^ that every moral
decision has to be made in a concrete situation. It is, therefore,
necessarily empirical and smeared with pathology. As such, even
though a specific act might be "good" it is never truly moral or purely
free, but is partly subject to the causal chains of nature.^^ Kant thus
rewrites the doctrine of Original Sin and concludes that man is
"radically" evil in the sense that a trace of non-moral pathology must
necessarily lie at the root {radix) of all human actions.^^
Of course, it is not inconsistent with the moral law to perform an
act which we both desire to perform (in the sense that it will increase
our happiness) and which is in compliance with the moral law. One
cannot assume, however, that the mere fact that an action would either
make us happy or that it would require self-sacrifice is any evidence of
whether it is moral or not. Morality is completely indifferent to

25 See Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88
CAL. L. REV. 653 (2000).
26

What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should directly
determine the will. If the determination of the will takes place in conformity indeed to
the moral law, but only by means of a feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be
presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the will, and therefore
not for the sake of the law, then the action will possess legality but not morality.
KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 12, at 92.
22 "This evil is radical, since it corrupts the groimd of all maxims; as natural propensity, it is
also not to be extirpated through human forces." IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON 59 (Allen Wood & George Di Giovanni ed. & trans., 1998)
[hereinafter, KANT, RELIGION]. As we explain elsewhere, see Schroeder & Carlson, supra note
25, at 657 n.l9, it is a common mis-perception that the Kantian term "radical" evil bears the
colloquial connotation of really, really extreme evil {i.e. diabolical evil), perhaps because of
Hannah Arendt's terminology in her famous work on the banality of evil. HANNAH ARENDT,
EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1964).
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pleasure and pain.^^
More radically, even if one could determine that one's actions
complied with the moral law one eould still never be sure of one's
motives.29 As finite humans, we can never really know our "true"
motives.30 That is, the pure reason that is essential to man is itself a
noumenon—a thing-in-itself.
The empirical individual is a
phenomenon who does not have direct contact with his own noumenal
essential self. In Kant's words, "[t]he depths of the human heart are
unfathomable."^' Consequently, none of us can directly know his own
self.32 Holiness—the state of achieving virtue understood as the perfect
congruence of one's maxims and the moral law—is, like mercy, an
attribute to God alone.^^ Like Augustine before him, Kant concludes
that man is always in a state of sin.34 The more moral a man is, the
more he desires to comply with the moral law for the sake of morality,
the more aware he is of the stain of his own pathology.
Kant's idea of a radical split between our conseious selves and
another essential "true" irmer self—the unconscious—^will reappear in
Lacan's attempt to rewrite Freud's psychoanalytic theory in light of
speculative thought.
C.

The Dialectical Relationship Between Law and Freedom

For Kant, the impossibility of knowing and achieving morality and

28 Moral laws "command for everyone without taking account of his inclinations, merely
because and insofar as he is free and has practical reason." KANT, MORALS, supra note 20, at 10.

29 In the words of Zizek, "we never know if the determinate content that accounts for the
specificity of our acts is the right one, that is, if we have really acted in accordance with the Law
and have not been guided by some hidden pathological motives." SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE TICKLISH
SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 365 (1999). [hereinafter ZIZEK,

TICKLISH SUBJECT].

20 In Allison's words, "[FJar from asserting a doctrine of unqualified noumenal freedom . . .
Kant explicitly asserts that since the intelligible character is inaccessible to us, we can never be
certain whether, or to what extent, a given action is due to nature or freedom." HENRY E.

ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM 43 (1990).
21 KANT, MORALS, supra note 20, at 196.

22 "For a human being cannot see into the depths of his own heart so as to be quite certain, in
even a single action, of the purity of his moral intention and the sincerity of his disposition, even
when he has no doubt about the legality of the action." Id. at 155.
22 Kant calls holiness "a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable
at any moment of his existence." KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 12, at 148.
24 Kant's conclusion can most strikingly be seen in the title he gave to Part One ol Religion
Within the Bounds of Mere Reason; namely ''Concerning the indwelling of the evil principle
alongside the good or Of the radical evil in human nature." KANT, RELIGION, supra note 27 at

45.

25 According to Kant, "In view of what has been said above, the statement, 'The human being
is evil; cannot mean anything else than that he is conscious of the moral law and yet has
incorporated into his maxim the (occasional) deviation from it." Id. at 55.
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hence freedom implies free will. If man could actually see into the
mind of God and know the moral law, he would no longer be selflegislating {i.e., free). He would be submitting to an external force. As
Kant puts it, "Man would be a marionette or an automaton. . .
Ironically, it is man's sin, his failure, his radical evilness, his inability to
be truly free that results in his practical freedom. As the common law
tradition knows, law, as well as freedom, is a work in process. In order
for the subject to be free, she must be self-legislating—constantly
creating new law. If, however, she ever succeeded in the task of
finishing and completely filling her world with law, this would bind her
and prevent her from spontaneously creating new law. She would no
longer be free.
Paradoxically, the reason the individual is able to
liberate herself from the causal chains of nature so that she might freely
bind herself to the moral law, is that every time she tries to bind herself
to the moral law the chains slip her wrists. Man is always a moral
Houdini despite herself. As we shall see due course,^^ Lacan will
identify this fundamental paradox as the sexual impasse—the part of
personality that is bound by law is the masculine, and the part that slips
away—like Eurydice and Hegelian essence—is the feminine.
Kant's concept of "radical" evil should not be confused with his
very different concept of "diabolical" evil. As we have discussed
elsewhere,^^ although man is always in the state of radical evil, Kant's
terminology is intended to express the conclusion that man is no more
capable of diabolism as he is of holiness. If virtue is the choice of
maxims that always comply with the moral law, then to be diabolical is
to adopt maxims that always violate the moral law. As morality's
inverse, diabolical evil is noumenal, and the test for diabolical evil is
also purely formal, not substantive. In his famous essay Kant avec
Sade, Lacan made the startling and correct conclusion that, as such,
diabolical evil is indistinguishable from morality—they both satisfy the
categorical imperative.
In fact, as so often happened, Hegel anticipated Lacan. In the
Philosophy of Right Hegel argues that morality is internally
contradictory and monstrous. It must be sublated into ethics precisely
for this reason.^^

KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 12, at 123. As we have said elsewhere: If the self
were noumenal, then God (a noumenon) would be our equal. God would stand before our eyes as
directly perceivable. We would lose our freedom, if we could directly know God's law. We
would be mere puppets in the thrall of the moral law. Ironically, morality would become legality,
and morality would be thoroughly pathological—that is natural. Schroeder & Carlson, supra note
25, at 667 (citations omitted).
37 See infra text at notes 88-103.
38 See Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 25.
39 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note l, at 174-84.
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

Having explored Kantian moral theory, we are now in the position
to read Hegel's aceount of right and wrong in the Philosophy of Right
and reconcile it to his understanding of the notions of essence and
appearance presented in the Science of Logic.
A.

The Bildungsroman of Personality

The Philosophy of Right is Hegel's extended critique of liberal
political philosophy. Hegel starts by adopting liberalism's grounding
principle—the Kantian autonomous individual in the state of nature.
Hegel then shows how this seemingly simple concept is, in fact, selfcontradictory and inadequate to the task assigned to it by Kant.
As Kant understood, free will must have no constraints whatever.
This implies that the completely free will is a totally negative
conception. The Kantian person has no properties, talents, bodily
manifestations or other phenomena because any such contingent,
empirical and subjective characteristics would be a limit on the
potentiality of the will.'"' In other words, the autonomous person is a
noumenon. That is to say, autonomy implies that the person has been
stripped of all appearances. Such a person is literally invisible.
How can such a creature have self-eonsciousness? If a person is to
be conscious of her own self—to contemplate her subjectivity as an
object—she must perceive herself. Yet if she has no appearance in the
world, she can neither perceive herself nor can anyone else do so.
Hegel's insight is that the Kantian autonomous person is not "objective"
to itself and therefore is not self-conscious. Self-consciousness requires
attributes. This means that moral philosophy can not be based on the
abstract noumenal person, as Kant would have it, but must account for
actual concrete phenomenal subjects. The task that Hegel takes on is
how can he move from Kant's true, but partial, insight that free will lies
at the heart of personality to an account of concrete subjectivity that is
capable of morality.
Hegel argues that right, and its negative corollary wrong, are the
means by which this initial primitive and abstract conception of
personality as free will develops into the more sophisticated and
concrete one of the moral subject. Consequently, the Philosophy of

40 Modem political philosophies will recognize this as the person behind the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance.
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Right can be read as the Bildungsroman of personality
B.

Property, Contract and Subjectivity

We have extensively explicated Hegel's theory of how the process
hy which free will obtains attributes and becomes a subject through
right elsewhere,"2 and will only touch lightly on this aspect of his
theory. To make a long story short, in the Philosophy of Right Hegel
argues that freedom in the state of nature is purely negative and,
therefore, only potential. Freedom becomes actual (what Kant would
call "practical") through intersubjective relationship with other persons.
Specifically, an abstract individual only becomes a subject if and when
another subject recognizes her as an equal subject. The problem should
be obvious. The abstract person understood as free will lacks all
individuating pathological characteristics—each abstract person is
identical to every other.^^ Just as the abstract person can not recognize
itself and achieve self-consciousness, it cannot recognize any of its
similarly characterless brethren. It is as though there is only one
abstract person in the state of nature.
The abstract individual engages in object relations in order to
achieve the recognizability necessary for relationships with other
subjects. The primitive object relations of abstract right are called
"property" and "contract." Hegel posits that the object relations of
property consist of possession, enjoyment, and alienation, understood in
the most general and abstract sense
Possession is the identification of an object to an individual person.
Although possession attaches individuating characteristics to the
possessor, possession fails to prove to the subject its own existence.
The person is now the slave to the object, when the point was to master
41 See Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97 (Drucilla
Cornell et al. eds., 1991).
42 See David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things with Hegel, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (2000);
JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LAGAN, PROPERTY, AND THE

FEMININE (1998).
.,
• U ,
43 See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 1, at 42,44, 54-57, 70. The problem is that
the concept of "absolutely free will" is empty, absfract, arbitrary and negative—it is, by
definition, totally stripped of all distinguishing characteristics. Id. at 27.
44 As discussed in detail elsewhere, it is a common modem error to conclude from the
observation that property comes in many different forms as an empirical matter, that there is
either no essential core of property as a logical or jurispmdential matter, or that property consists
of an arbitrary bundle of a number of rights picked from a long laundry list. See Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Never Jam To-Day: On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence, 84 GEO. L. J.
1531, 1537-50 (1996) [hereinafter, Schroeder, Never Jam To-day^. A Hegelian position argues
that one can identify a minimum definition of property so long as one stays at the appropriate
level of abstraction. For example, the rights to sell, pledge, bequeath, and so forth can be
analyzed as specific examples of the more general concept of the right of alienation.
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the object. Person and object are identified with each other so that one
can not tell which is which. The person tries to prove his mastery by
enjoying or consuming the object. But if the object is consumed, the
subject is right back where it started from. Moreover, insofar as the
person's claim to mastery depends on its relationship to the object
through enjoyment, the claim is revealed to be hollow. The person is
dependent on his enjoyment in precisely the same way an addict is
dependent on his drug. Such abject dependency is a denial of freedom.
Consequently, the subject must prove its independence from the object.
Only then is it a subject separate and apart from the object.
The person, therefore, must disencumber herself from any specific
object while still maintaining the object relations necessary for
recognizability. Hegel discussed three possible modes of alienation:
abandonment, gift, and contract. For reasons that we explain elsewhere,
only contract is adequate for the goal of recognizability.''^
In contract, two persons exchange objects with each other. By
doing so, each demonstrates his status of a subject independent of any
specific object while simultaneously maintaining the continuity of
object relations necessary for recognizability. More importantly,
because contract is mutual, each party necessarily recognizes the other
as a free subject like himself. At the moment of contract, the subjective
particular wills of each person for a moment eome together as a single
objective common will.
It is incorrect, however, to think that in contract two "subjects"
exchange "property." Both subjectivity^^ and property only come into
existence for the first time through the recognition of contract."^
Indeed, Hegel's point is that which is really exchanged is recognition as
such.''^
C.

Wrong

Before defining right, Hegel first describes its funetion. By
necessity, he can only do this indirectly by discussing its negative—
wrong.

•'S See ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN
JURISPRUDENCE 34 (1995).
46 More accurately, the contracting parties, although no longer merely abstract free will, are
not yet completely subjects. Full subjectivity—which comprises the capacity for moral reasoning
as well as the recognition of right—when right is fully actualized and sublated and the person
internalizes the universality of right s morality.
43 See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 1, at 104 (in exchange, "I am and remain
an owner of property, having being for myself and excluding the will of another, only in so far as,
in identifying my will with that of another, I cease to be an owner of property").
48 Carlson, supra note 42, at 1391.
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At the end of the analysis of contract, two particular wills have
produced the mutual recognition of right, which can be viewed as a
middle term between two particular extremes. The middle term is the
common will.
Wrong constitutes the reassertion of particularity at the expense of
the common will. Wrong is the false assertion that what is merely
contingent, particular and subjective has the status of that which is
necessary, universal and objective. As such, wrong can be seen as an
impossible attempt to regress to the pre-contractual state while retaining
the individuation and recognizability that can only be attained in
contract. In wrong, the person treats the other subject as a nullity, but
since a person's very cognizability must be bestowed by the other,
nullification of the other is nullification of self.
There are three levels of wrong, judged qualitatively by the extent
to which the regime of right is negated. First is basic civil wrong. A
claims a right to B's thing. B denies it. Each claims right is on her side.
"Both parties agree that universal right should be realized, even though
it may be temporarily thwarted.'"^^ This is the least serious form of
wrong because the wrongdoer does not deny the concept of right. He
merely confounds his particular will with the common will. In other
word, civil wrong is a form of error.
More ominous is fraud.
[HJere the universal right... is reduced to a mere semblance. The
perpetrator of fraud tacitly withdraws from intersubjective
agreements and treats right as a means to his own private end. He
thereby reduces the outward manifestation of right to a mere
semblance while concealing his private interest. The particular
person who is deceived is '"shown respect'" in the sense that he is
offered the semblance of right as part of the deception.

Fraud is more serious than civil wrong in that the fraudster does
not erroneously confuse his particular will with the eommon will, but
intentionally imposes the former over the latter. And yet, in his attempt
to defraud others, the fraudster necessarily poses his false claims as
though justified by law. In other words, in fraud the wrongdoer cares
about what the victims thinks. By cultivating the semblance of right,
the fraudster pays homage to it.
Most serious of all is crime. In crime, the wrongdoer sets up his
own particular will as the absolute criterion. In crime, "[tjhe other
person against whom the crime is committed is not expected to regard
the wrong, which has being in and for itself, as right.
Unlike civil wrong and fraud, crime is, therefore, an attempt to
49 WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 153.
50 Id.
51 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note l, at 116.
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negate right itself. This criminal attempt to consume the entire field of
right must necessarily fail. Just as the subject who consumes his objects
entirely vanishes into a state of indeterminacy, so the criminal who
denies the regime of right negates herself. This leads Hegel to the
conclusion that the very personhood of the criminal demands her own
punishmentP
It is in this context that Hegel equates essence with right and
semblance or illusory being with wrong. As we have discussed, Hegel
should not be interpreted as saying that, when wrong falls apart of its
own accord, rightness will appear. A careful reading of the Philosophy
of Right, supplemented with an understanding of the vocabulary
developed in the Science of Logic, shows something rather different.
Right is not that which remains when wrong is revealed as illusion.
Rather, right only becomes actualized in dissolving wrongs — it is
nothing but the act of righting wrong. Any other affirmative definition
of right is itself a wrong. A specific claim to a particular right is always
empirical and, therefore, contingent and particular. Any such assertion
is always wrong. As we shall see, this is precisely the Lacanian analysis
of the relationship of the masculine and the feminine to the symbolic
order.
Let us look more carefully at how this works in Hegel's specific
analysis of the three species of wrong.
1. Crime.
Hegel starts his discussion of wrong with a
consideration of the least of evils and moves up to the worst. We
reverse the order, in imitation of Hamlet,^^ and start with crime.
As we have seen, both civil wrong and deception manifest some
respect for right. Crime, in contrast, is a complete denial or negation of
right. It is a "negatively infinite judgment.''^"* Some examples:
'"The mind is no elephant'"; '"A lion is no table'"; propositions
which are correct but absurd .... [Tjhey are not judgments at all,
and can only occur in a subjective thought where even an untme
abstraction may hold its ground.^^

This seems bizarre at first impression. In what sense is crime the
same as the proposition, "The mind is no elephant?" And why is such a
statement said to be not a judgment?
The answer is that this absurd phrase is simply the form for a
52 Punishment stands for the common will in predominance over the private will. But since
the person is just as much the public will as she is the private will, the demand for punishment is
a self-demand.
53 "I must be cruel only to be kind. Thus bad begins and worse remains behind." 5 WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE act 3, SC. 5 (1909).
54 HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 1, at 121.
55 G. W. F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC 238 (William Wallace trans., 1975) [hereinafter, HEGEL,

THE LESSER LOGIC].
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certain logical relation between subjeet and predicate. The negative
infinite judgment's theory is that there is no relation whatsoever—the
subject is absolutely independent of the predicate.
A very brief tour of Hegel's theory of subjectivity in the Science of
Logic will help make clear the role of negative infinite judgment. At
the end of his discussion of essence, immediacy is finally obliterated.
"Reality" finally comes to an end, and we are left with a mad
subjectivity—a subjectivity absolutely separate and apart from nature.
What the subject—Hegel calls it Begriff (notion or concept)—^must do
is to legislate its own reality, so that reality is no alien "beyond" but
rather subjectivity's own fi-ee creation. In short, it is the job of the
Notion to will, for itself, an objective reality, in which it is both subject
(active and self-sublating) and object (passive and enduring).
Why must the notion do this? For the same reason that, in the
Philosophy of Right, the autonomous subjeet reaches out to another
autonomous subject for recognition. A subject facing no reality at all
cannot perceive itself, because it lacks any appearance by which it can
perceive itself. Yet it wishes to know itself. It wishes to be. It craves
self-certainty.
At first. Notion is the abstract understanding, which must now
make the same old mistakes we saw demolished earlier in the objective
logic, except that this time it will be performed subjectively. The first
set of judgments are the judgments of existence. These judgments are
not properly judgments at all, but merely subjective propositions.
When diverse words are merely conjoined, we have only
proposition. A proposition asserts A = B, but this is just as much A 7^: B,
since A is held to be completely diverse from B. In a judgment, A is B
in a more essential way than the mere subjective conjunction of A and B
by external reflection. That is, in a true judgment, A is ww/veraa/Zy B. If
a statement enunciates something non-universal about a subject, then
we have a mere proposition. Judgments function as the determination
of the "universal" truth of the subject. In short judgments purport to be
complete.
In effect, the "judgments" of existence assert the immediacy and
hence the diversity of the subject, compared to the predicate. For this
reason, Hegel reveals that these "judgments" are, in fact, not properly
judgments at all, precisely because they do not traffic in universality.
The first of these judgments is the positive judgment. It asserts
that the subject is the predicate. But which predicate? It is impossible
to name them all. Something must be left out because there is an
infinity of predicates. Therefore positive judgment yields the negative
judgment—subject is not the predicate, or can not be reduced to any one
56 See JOHN MCCUMBER, THE COMPANY OF WORDS: HEGEL, LANGUAGE AND SYSTEMATIC
PHILOSOPHY 37-38 (1993).
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predicate. The predicate cannot be entirely named. Some of the
predicates inevitably escape. The form of the negative judgment is
"The rose is not red." Negative judgment implies, however, that there
is a predicate. It's just that it doesn't happen to be red. Beyond that it
says nothing. Negative judgment therefore depends on external
reflection—or positive law—to determine what the subject is.
Notion must make its own reality if it is to be free. It cannot accept
a reality imposed on it from the outside. One-sided understanding
therefore proposes the negative infinite judgment: the subject is
absolutely free and independent of predication in general. This denial
of predication is what Hegel thinks crime is.
Why does the negative infinite judgment take the form of "spirit is
not red," or "the rose is not an elephant?" Recall that the negative
judgment was "the rose is not red." The negative judgment negated red
but admitted predication—^the rose had some color. The absurdity of
the negative infinite judgment prevents the inference of any predication
at all. Therefore, it refuses to negate something sensible. It negates
something so absurd that nothing can be deduced from the negation of a
single predicate.
Applying the negative infinite judgment to the Philosophy of Right,
the person was shown to be predicated in the recognition of another
person. In contract, each person recognizes the other person by the
other's properties. Without this exchange of recognition, the person
would be an indeterminate nothing. The other person is therefore the
predicate on which the subject is dependent.
The criminal denies the importance of predication altogether. She
insists the she is a subject separate and apart from any recognition. In
this guise, she attempts to coerce her victim into following her will.
Crime is the "initial use of coercion."^''
The criminal turns her back on the other, whose recognition was
the very foundation of her personality. Yet without that recognition, the
criminal loses all her properties and reverts to the invisibility of the
autonomous subject prior to the exchange of properties.
Because crime implies the invisibility of the subject—the
retrogression of the person back into the realm of the pre-symbolic
"real"—crime negates itself and demands its own punishment.
Punishment is the negation of the negation. It is coercion against crime,
and so "coercion is cancelled ... by coercion."^^ For this reason:
Abstract right is a coercive right, because a wrong committed against
it is a force directed against the existence ... of my freedom in an
external thing
To define abstract right—or right in the strict
sense—from the start as a right which justifies the use of coercion is
57 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 1, atl 21.
58 Id. at 120.
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to interpret... it in the light of a consequence which arises only
indirectly by way of wrong.^^
That is, if right is that which is enforced by coercion, then right can
only be discerned when it is enforced, and enforcement requires that the
right first be violated in wrong. Paradoxically, wrong precedes right.
Punishment—^the empirical negation of crime—is both the truth of
crime and the actualization of right. "The manifestation of its nullity is
that the nullification of the infringement likewise comes into existenee;
this is the actuality of right, as its necessity which mediates itself with
itself through the cancellation ... of its infringement.''^"
In other words, Hegel argues not merely that right will be
actualized in the punishment of crime, but that crime itself requires this
punishment."^ In Hegel's metaphor "The Eumenides sleep, but crime
awakens them; thus the deed brings its own retribution with it.""^
The practice of the American press in reporting crimes and trials
intuits this point. American journalists avoid referring to a suspect or a
defendant as a criminal and resort to euphemisms such as "the accused"
or "the alleged assailant." Sometimes they take this seemingly to the
point of absurdity such as when, in the case of workplace violenee when
one employee "goes postal" and shoots co-workers while witnessed by
a large number of other persons. The violence might even be caught on
film. And yet, even though there is no question that the person in
question committed the act in question, the press will persist on
referring to him as the "purported gunman" until he is actually
convicted and sentenced.
Journalists tend to assume their practiee springs from the
constitutional presumption that defendants are presumed innoeent
unless their guilt is proven in a court of law. Yet this explanation is not
completely satisfactory. The constitutional limitations only apply to the
government and the constitutional freedoms of press and speech should
generally protect the media's truthful reporting."^ This practice does,
however, imperfectly and clumsily reflects the Hegelian understanding
of crime. Both crime and right can only be actualized retroactively
when the criminal law is enforced. We call the defendant the "alleged
59 Id.?A 121.
50 Id. at 123.
5' Crime claims an affirmative characteristic, and indeed "[w]hen an infringement of right as
right occurs, it does have a positive extemal existence." Id. at 123. Nevertheless, this is
semblance because "this existence within itself is null and void." Id. "The nullity is [the
presumption] that right as right has been cancelled. . . For right as an absolute, cannot be
cancelled, so that the expression of crime is within itself null and void." Id. That is, although
crime does have affirmative effects in the world, crime itself is not an affirmation, but a negation
of right. Insofar as there is such a thing as right, however, this negation asserted by crime has no
content, it is totally negative.
52 Id. at 129.
53 Although, in relatively rare occasions, the press will cross the line and commit libel.
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murderer" not merely because there is the possibility that individual
sitting in the dock might be wrongfully accused or might be found not
guilty by reason of insanity or because of some procedural error.
Rather, it is because until the conviction, there is no murder—although
there might be an individual who has killed another individual. The
term "murder" is a legal conclusion, not a matter of fact. Right blooms
forth only after it cancels the wrong—negates the negation—in
enforcement.
2. Civil Wrong. Most commentators on the Philosophy of Right
pass quickly from his dialectic of the creation of right in property and
contract to his highly original analysis of crime without an extended
examination of his intervening discussion of civil wrong. This is
unfortunate because, although very short, it is absolutely necessary for
an understanding of what Hegel means when he says that wrong is
appearance and right is essence.
a. Civil Wrong as Negative Judgment. Civil wrong is the
negative judgment pure and simple where merely the particular law
is violated, while law in general is so far aeknowledged. Such a
dispute is precisely paralleled by a negative judgment, like, '"This
flower is not red'": by which we merely deny the particular colour of
the flower, but not its colour in general. . .

How is a civil wrong the same as the non-redness of the flower?
Once again, this negative predicate is the form of a judgment which, in
effect, denies that the predicate can be known completely. The negative
judgment implies that there is a relation of subject to predicate, but that
external reflection—^positive law—must tell the subject what it is.
Now Hegel makes clear that the negative judgment is in fact also a
positive judgment. It names at least one predicate ("not red"). But this
very naming of the predicate is inadequate to the subject. It is therefore
a wrong, in the sense that the positivization of the predicate is one-sided
and incomplete. In short, the status of civil wrong as the negative
judgment reinforces the thesis of this essay—^wrong always precedes
right, and right is not positivizable. To positivize is to phenomenalize
the law, and this is precisely wrong.
Civil wrong, Hegel says, is to be considered "right in itself."^^
"What is right in itself has a determinate ground, and the wrong which I
hold to be right I also defend on some ground or other."^^ In other
words, a civil wrongdoer bases his claim of right on legal research—on
some ground in the positive law of statutes or judicial precedents. Such
64 HEGEL, THE LESSER LOGIC, supra note 55, at 238.
65 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 1, at 113.
66 w. at 117.
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a legal claim, however, is fixed and rigid—or, as Hegel says, finite.^?
As such, it is not "true" or "right." The true and the right are precisely
the disappearance of such fixities. "It is in the nature of the finite and
particular that it leaves room for contingencies; collisions must
therefore occur...
Wrong in the sense of grounded claims to right
are therefore logically built into the system of right. Without the legal
research to produce fixed wrongs, there could be no right to fix the
wrong.
b. Wrong Always Precedes Right. Hegel presents his discussion
of civil wrong in the aftermath of contract, but there is a way in which
property itself, which logically precedes contract, is a wrong. If so, then
the very emergence of subjectivity in the first place is founded on
wrong—^retroactively made right by contract.
Hegel is frequently misinterpreted as adopting a first-occupier
theory of property rights, much like Locke. This reading is based on the
following passage in his discussion of possession:
That a thing . . . belongs to the person who happens to be the first to
take possession of it is an immediately self-evident and superfluous
determination, because a second party cannot take possession of
what is already the property of someone else.^^
In context, however, it is clear that this passage is intended merely
as a definition of what possession is, not any assertion as to the
rightfulness of any specific claim to possession. Possession is the rule
of first-in-time,
first-in-right—the claim of the party already in
"possession" to exclude any second-in-time party. As Hegel states "The
first is not the rightful owner because he is the first, hut because he is a
fi"ee will, for it is only the fact that another comes after him which
makes him the first.
As any lawyer knows, a strict xmiversal first-intime, first-in-right regime is not, and could not he, the rule of any actual
legal system. Even Locke had his "proviso": that first possession is
rightful only if one leaves behind enough resources to provide for
persons with no first possessory rights."''
Moreover, a consideration of Hegel's analysis of the role of
property in the creation of personality should make it clear that Hegel
could not adopt a first-occupier justification of property. For Hegel, a
claim to possession is only the logically first element of property. It is
the particular action of a single subjective will and therefore a wrong
See id. at 118.
68 /rf. atll7.
69 Mat 81.
70 Id.
71 According to Locke, there is a natural right to acquire property "at least where there is
enough, and as good left in common for others." JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967).
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against all other such wills. Right only comes into being with contract.
Consequently, at the simplest level, claims of a first possessor can not
be rightful since they arrive prior to the creation of rights. Hegel's point
will be that all claims to possession, even after the development of
sophisticated regime of positive law, are wrongful in the sense that the
essence of right can only be actualized indirectly in contrast to the
appearance of wrong. This means that wrong precedes right.
Hegel expressly addresses—and rejects—^the first-occupier
theory of property in his discussion of the necessary presence of civil
wrong in the regime of right. Prior to contract, there can only be a
collision of claims to right.^^ Different persons may claim "possession"
of the same thing, but they have no logical justification for imposing
their particular will against each other. Insofar as any claimant
successfully excludes others from a contested object, this is merely a
result of brute force. All such claims to possession are, therefore,
merely appearance, semblance. It is only when persons mutually agree
to recognize each other's respective claims that possession can for the
first time can seen as rightful, and legal (i.e. property).
For the parties involved, the recognition of right is bound up with
their particular opposing interests and points of view. In opposition
to this semblance, yet at the same time within the semblance itself. .
. right in itself emerges as something represented and required. But it
appears at first only as an obligation, because the will is not yet
present as a will which has freed itself from the immediacy of
interest in such a way that, as a particular will, it has the universal
will as its end. Nor is it here determined as a recognized actuality of
such a kind that, when confronted with it, the parties would have to
renounce their particular points of view.^^

One can see at this early stage of Hegel's diseussion, that wrong
(appearance) is not an error or illusion that will disappear when right
(essenee) is revealed, but that the former is a necessary building block
of the latter.
In the above aecount, contract is the foundation of property itself.
Until contract, any claim to property was criminal because it denied all
right to any other free self. Retroactively, property became legitimate
when it was bestowed on the free self by the other.
what initially
began as wrong retroaetively became legal possession of property.''^
72 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 1, at 117.
73 Id.
74 For this reason, Hegel remarks, "In contract, right in itself present as something posited..
W. at 115. That is to say, absent contract, right is not posited. Right only appears with
establishment of the contraet. Id. Prior to the contract, everything is wrong.
75 BRUDNER, supra note, 45, at 23 ("Property ... is thus perfected in exchange."). Hegel
emphasizes that, in contract, the properties deem the commodities actually swapped have equal
exchange value. As he puts it, A retains value but gives up property. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT, supra note 1, at 107. But, if we are right that recognition (not property) is exchanged.
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One might be tempted to argue that whether or not the foregoing
account is a convincing justification for the modem capitalist economy
from the starting place of the hypothetical state of nature, it does not
describe the actual practice of property and contract. That is, as an
empirical matter, most contract and property claims are clear from the
start (and therefore right) and a only a very tiny proportion are initially
disputed and then determined in a court of law.''^ Indeed, no
commercial society could function otherwise. This argument misses
what Hegel means by the stmctural logic of the concepts of right and
wrong.
Let us take an extremely simple property contract of the type
most of us transact on a daily business. We go to a grocery store, take a
carton of milk out of the refrigerator case, bring it to the check-out. The
cashier rings up a price. We hand cash to the cashier in the amount of
the price and then take the carton of milk home. Can't we say that, at
least here, the property rights are clear? Before the sale, the grocer
clearly "owned" the milk, and after the sale we do? Aren't the contract
rights equally clear? By putting the milk in the refrigerator case is the
grocer making an offer to sell the milk to anyone who will tender the
purchase price; by bringing the carton to the cashier and handing cash in
the amoimt mng up on the cash register to the cashier do we
simultaneously accept the offer and tender performance, giving us the
right to enforce the contract against the grocer by taking possession of
the milk? Yes, for all practical purposes. But the internal logic of the
transaction is as Hegel describes.
Prior to the transaction, the grocer claims a particular right to the
milk—that is, to exclude the entire world including myself. But there is
always the very real possibility that the grocer's claim is not rightful
against all other competing claims; perhaps the grocer has purchased
stolen milk. When we pick up the carton of milk and bring legal tender
to the cashier we are also making a particular claim to the milk not
merely against the world generally, but against the grocer specifically.
Our claim and the grocer's claim are potentially in conflict so that at
this moment only one of them can be rightful or, perhaps more
accurately, both are in question and, therefore, at least partially
wrongful in the Hegelian sense.
In the vast majority of cases, we will usually agree that we will
recognize the grocer's right to the milk unless we pay for it (exchange
money for it) and the grocer will recognize that we will have the right to
the milk after the exchange. That is, our two warring particular wills
have now been resolved through the formation of a common will—^what
then the property given up is the property that B retained all along.
This is H.L.A. Hart's pseudo-empirical claim that law is determinate "most" of the time.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 148 (1961).
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American lawyers call a meeting of minds. Empirically this will also
resolve all other claims against the "world" so that the determination at
that moment becomes universal and objective and, therefore, right. The
whole dialectic occurs so quickly in these easy cases that the contract
parties never become aware of the conflict that initially existed.
Nevertheless, contract must be seen as the dissolution of wrong.
Moreover, even if the grocer and I form a contract with a
common will, this common will is only potentially universal and
objective. If the milk had been stolen neither the grocer nor I have any
right enforceable against the original owner regardless of how innocent
any of us are as to the theft.'^'^ Our respective claims to the milk are
mere semblance, or wrong. Often, the value of the transaction is so
small that the parties make no attempt to resolve the conflict. No one is
going to sue over one carton of milk that will probably have spoiled by
the time one can write and file a complaint. As the value and
permanence of the object increases, however, these potential claims take
on real significance.
The point in all these cases is that the right of these transactions
does not pre-exist the transaction. Rather the transaction is right
because there is a voluntary resolution of the potential conflicting
claims that lead up to the transaction. To say we leave the grocery store
with "our" milk, can only be understood as saying that we have reached
a consensus that anybody else's claim to the same milk would be
wrong. Right can only be defined in this negative sense.
Once again, one might be tempted to say that, even if the sales
transaction starts from an initial state of inherent conflict, once the sales
contract has been performed by both sides (and assuming that the object
to the contract had not been stolen), then all wrongs have been resolved
and buyer can rightfully claim to be the owner of the object. Doesn't
right at this point takes on an affirmative determinate aspect so that it
can be defined positively and not merely negatively as the righting of
wrongs? Isn't the buyer's claim to ownership now permanent,
objective, necessary and universal, and no longer mere appearance?
The Hegelian answer is that although right is actualized at this
moment and is therefore affirmatively manifested in the empirical
If the grocer has voidable title in the milk, his initial claim to the milk is once again
wrongful vis-a-vis the original owner. After the transaction, our claim to the milk vis-a-vis the
original owner will depend on whether we can establish that we are good faith purchaser for value
within § 2-403(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). As an empirical matter this will
probably be the case more often than not so we do not have to consciously think about this rule.
Nevertheless, the conflict still exists. Finally, if the grocer has granted a security interest in the
milk to a bank our right to the milk will depend on whether the grocer continues to pay his loan as
it becomes due or, if not, whether we can establish that we are buyers in the ordinary course
entitled to the protections of §§ 9-320(a) or 9-315(a)(l) of the UCC. Once again, in the grocery
store case, the facts are usually so simple that the potential conflicts (wrong) are resolved
virtually instantaneously.
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world, all actualizations, being empiricgl, are immediately revealed to
be contingent and, therefore, mere appearance. That is, although right
comes into being at the time the buyer's claim for the object is
recognized in contract, any claim that this right is permanently good
against everyone else in the world is a potential cause of conflict and a
semblance.^^
a. The Contingency of Right. Hegel expresses the dependency of
right upon civil wrong in another way. As we have seen, contract is
right in that it is the formation of a general will that is more necessary
and objective than the particular will of the two contracting parties.
But, this common will can only be created through the fusion of two or
more particular wills each of which is contingent, particular and
subjective—a semblance and, therefore, wrong. The right of contract
can only be understood as the resolution of the conflict between these
two wrongs.
Right in itself, the universal will, is essentially determined by the
particular will, and thus stands in relation ... to something
inessential. This is the relationship ... of the essence to its
appearance. . . . appearance is the stage of contingency, or essence
in relation ... to the inessential. But in the case of wrong,
appearance goes on to become a semblance. A semblance is
existence inappropriate to the essence. . . . Semblance is therefore
the untruth which disappears because it seeks to exist for itself, and
in this the untruth which disappears because it seeks to exist for
itself, and in this disappearance, essence has shown itself as essence,
that is, as the power over semblance. . . . —Wrong is a semblance of
this kind, and through its disappearance, right acquires the
determination of something fixed and valid. . . . Whereas right
previously had only an immediate being, it now becomes actual as it
returns out of its negation; for actuality is that which is effective and
sustains itself in its otherness, whereas the immediate still remains
liable to negation.''^
If wrong is semblance, then the actualization of right in contract
is the negation of that negation—a sublation. In sublation, that which is
negated is not destroyed but is preserved.^'' Consequently, even
78 The fact that all property claims are relative and contingent becomes obvious by the fact
that, if the owner fails to pay her debts as they become due, her creditors might have the right to
take the object. The government might impose zoning, licensing and other restrictions on the
rights to use and alienate the object. Or it might take the object under its power of eminent
domain. Or it might have the right to confiscate the object if, for example, it is used in the
promulgation of certain crimes. The owner may wish to use the object to raise money by selling,
leasing or hypothecating it, creating new classes of rival claimants. The object may be stolen or
taken away from the original owner by fraud. And finally, all natural owners die and their
property is transferred to an estate to be distributed among rival claimants.
79 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 1, at 115-16.
80 Carlson, Quality, supra note 8, at 452-53.
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actualized right must preserve some element of wrong—the seed of its
own corruption. Contract is the formation of a common will but this
common will is itself necessarily contingent. That is, the logic of
personality demands that individuals seek to enter into contract in order
to gain the recognition that will make them into subjects. As an
empirical matter, however, the two contracting parties are not conscious
of this. Each party experiences himself only as seeking to impose his
particular will on the world. A common will is created if, by
coincidence, the respective particular wills of two or more parties just
happen to overlap.
For the parties involved, the recognition of right is bound up with
their particular opposing interests and points of view. In opposition
to this semblance, yet at the same time within the semblance itself. .
. , with in itself emerges as something represented . . . and required.
But it appears at first only as an obligation, because the will is not
yet present as a will which has freed itself from the immediacy of
interest in such a way that, as a particular will, it has the universal
will as its end. Nor is it here determined as a recognized actuality of
such a kind that, when confronted with it, the parties would have to
renounce their particular points of view.^'

That is, when one goes to the grocery store, one does not say to ourself
"In order to achieve and maintain my self-consciousness over time, I
shall seek recognition from the grocer who I shall recognize as an equal
free self-consciousness." Rather, one thinks something like "I want
milk." As a result, in most cases one gives little thought as to the
identity of the grocer and will probably choose what store to go to on
other particular and contingent grounds such as location or price. The
grocer's conscious thoughts are no doubt equally as self-involved—"I
want money." If it just so happens one walks into a store that has the
type of milk she wants at a price that she feels is appropriate, the grocer
and the customer will join in a common will and she will buy the milk.
But this commonality is itself contingent and fleeting.^^
But Hegel is even more radical than this. From a Hegelian
perspective, imperfection is a necessary aspect of perfection itself and
of human freedom. Moreover, wrong is necessary for right not merely
because right can only be actualized as the righting of a wrong. It is
also the case that every righting of a wrong itself necessarily must
include a "wrongful" moment in order for right to be effective.
b. The Necessary Imperfection of Perfection. Where is the
necessary but ghostly "wrong" that haunts Hegel's abstract right
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 1, at 117.
"It is in the nature of the finite and particular that it leaves room for contingencies;
collision must therefore occtu", for we are here at the level of the finite." Id. at 117-18.
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understood as private law?
As one of us has explained elsewhere,the desire of the abstract
person to achieve subjectivity through intersubjective recognition is
fundamentally erotic. Yet, to paraphrase Lacan, there are no contractual
relations;^"' there must be always a partially failed encounter.
This idea can be glimpsed in the concept of the perfect market as
developed in the price theory of neo-classical economics. The perfect
market is the end of actual markets in both senses of the term: its ideal
and its doom. Supposedly, under competitive conditions, actual
markets will tend to become more and more like the perfect market.
This perfect market, however, is that hypothetical state in which all
objects in the market have always already been transferred to the
highest valuing user, at which time all distinction between market
participants and objects, and time and space themselves, disappear.
This means that the actual market would end if it reached perfection.
For actual markets to function they must be imperfect.^® This reflects
the Hegelian-Lacanian insight that the ideal of perfection is only
generated by recognition of the fact of imperfection. When all
imperfections and all wrongs disapear, then all markets and all right
disappear as well.
The existence of an abstract right that is always generated by
wrong, like the imperfection of actual market, enables us to create
ourselves as inter-relational subjects and allows us occasionally to
actualize our freedom. We experience ecstasy at these moments, albeit
fleetingly. The fact that wrong exists means that our freedom is not
perfect, that exploitation occurs, that alienation is a universal experience
of modem man—^but it also means that the market regime establishes
the conditions under which we occasionally glimpse and exercise
freedom, attain equality, and experience love. As Lacan would say,
without tears, the eye is blind.
Wrong is always a necessary component of right because in order
for the dialectic of right to function, it is necessary that it fail. Indeed,
its continued success requires its continuing failure. We interrelate
because we desire to end our separation, but in order for us to interrelate
we must continue to be separate. If we failed to remain separate we
83 SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 42; JEANNE LORRAINE
SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET (forthcoming, 2003)
[hereinafter, Schroeder, Triumph of Venus].

84 Lacan famously said that there are no sexual relations.
85 See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE METASTASIS OF ENJOYMENT: SIX ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND

CAUSALITY 188-89 (1994).
86 See generally David Gray Carlson, On the Margins of Microeconomics, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1867 (1993).
87 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK XX: ENCORE, ON FEMININE
SEXUALITY, THE LIMITS OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE 1972-1973 109 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed.
Bruce Fink trans., 1998) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR XX].
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would regress back to the undifferentiated negative state of the free will
before contract. If we did not feel restrained, we would not fight for
and actualize our freedom.
IV.

LACAN: THE CREATION OF LAW IN THE REPRESSION OF
THE FEMININE

We are now in a position to analyze the Lacanian ideas of
masculine metaphor, on one hand, and feminine metonymy, on the
other.
A.

Constraint Creates Freedom

In Lacan's terminology, sexuality is not a biological category,
but a symbolic one.^^ The masculine is the aspect of subjectivity
completely circumscribed by the symbolic order of language and law,
while the feminine is the aspect that cannot be so confined.
As understood by Kant and Hegel, freedom is, at least initially,
totally negative. It is merely the absence of restraints, but as such it has
no affirmative content. Liberal freedom is, therefore, in the Lacanian
order of the real—^that which is hypothesized as existing outside of the
borders of the symbolic and imaginary orders. Nevertheless, the
Lacanian-Hegelian understanding of personality is precisely that the
boundaries formed by the symbolic and the imaginary {i.e. social
constructs) produce an excessive unbound moment as well.
Paradoxically, the real is necessary for the existence of the symbolic
and the imaginary. In order for the symbolic and the imaginary to
function, they must repress the real (wall it out). Similarly, perfect
freedom without any restraints is purely negative. In order for freedom
to be actualized, there must be a contraint for freedom to negate.
It is our hypothesis that, even when a regime of positive law
embraces the liberal proposition that all humans are inherently free, in
order to function, the law must act as though it is a closed system that
constrains all human activities. It is in the nature of law that it must
always be known in advance of its application.^^ This means that law

This should not be interpreted as a naive denial of biological differences or of the
possibility that biology might affect behavior. It is a recognition of the fact that hiunan beings
have no immediate conscious connection to their biology, but always interpret and mediate their
physical experiences through language and imagery (the symbolic and the imaginary). The
terminology reflects the fact that we conflate symbolic sexuality with biological "reality" so that
people have a tendency to adopt the sexual position that corresponds to their biology.
89 The implications of this are explored in David Gray Carlson, The Traumatic Dimension in
Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2287 (2003).
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must have always already have anticipated and established a rule for
any and all possible behavior. The law is in this sense masculine—it
constrains completely, all of the time. But for this to be so, law must
repress the subjective, particular and contingent aspect. This reflects
the Hegelian analysis that any positive legal claims is mere appearance,
and therefore, a wrong.
Why do we say that law is a masculine proposition and therefore
wrong? As is well known, it is a basic Lacanian proposition that the
subject is a pure negativity—castrated and split. The two sexes are two
positions one take with respect to this universal fact; denial
(masculinity) and acceptance (femininity).
The masculine falsely (or, more accurately, delusionally) claims
to have the phallus, the symbol of subjectivity. That is, he claims to
have "it", whatever "it" might be that could him positive, not negative,
split or castrated; that which would make him potent and make action
possible. The masculine position claims to be complete. Lack, failure,
emptiness, mediation, the possibility of unplanned contingencies,
arbitrariness and unmotivated behavior—anything and everything that
would reveal the lie of the masculine claim to be in control are
prohibited by the masculine.
If the masculine is nothing but the denial of lack, then the
feminine is nothing but its acceptance. Consequendy, both sexes
identify lack, negativity, and subjectivity with the feminine. In order
for the masculine to maintain his position, he must necessarily represses
the feminine that is its denial.^o in the application of law, "it" is
certainty; the judge knows what the law "is"—^knows which particular
claim will be recognized as universal and, therefore, ^ right.
Consequently, in order for the judge to pronounce judgment "he" must
become masculine.
This creates several paradoxes, only a few of which we raise
here. To say that one knows what the law "is" is to imagine that the law
is "objective"—it is to declare that one is bound by the law, and that one
is not exercising subjectivity. Consequently, by proclaiming his active
subjectivity, the masculine finds himself in the position of passive
objectivity. The subjectivity that is repressed is the feminine.
This is why the masculine claims to subjectivity, freedom and
activity are hollow. The masculine is not merely castrated, but totally
constrained by the symbolic order and is, therefore, objective, bound,
impotent and passive. He is the caused phenomenon—the merely

A woman can but be excluded by the nature of things, which is the nature of words,
and it must be said that if there is something that women themselves complain about
enough for the time being, that's it.
LACAN, SEMINAR XX, supra note 87, at 73.
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empirical side of Kant's third antinomy. He has boxed himself in so
tightly he has no room left to move.
These paradoxes of sexuality parallel the Hegelian paradoxes of
wrong and right. As we have seen, from a Hegelian perspective, right
can only be understood as the negation of wrongs—the resolution of
necessarily conflicting claims. This means, however, that not only is
right created by wrong, it can only be known indirectly through wrong.
For a judge to resolve a conflict and declare one rival's claim to be
"right" is, by definition, to declare it universal, objective, essential. But,
from a Hegelian perspective, all such claims are necessarily fleeting
because they immediately create possibility for new conflict. The
judgment, which seemed essential when declared, is immediately
revealed to be mere appearance in the sense of contingent and particular
to the specific claimants and the specific dispute adjudicated. The
eommon law intuits this when it always insists on calling a judicial
order a mere "opinion." Insofar as the law insists that it is right and
objective, it is declaring appearance to be to be its essence. This is
semblance, the definition of wrong.
Any restatement of right, therefore, always turns into its
opposite—a wrong. Right ean only be understood as the resolution of
the next wrong. This is reflected in the common law's concept of
"precedent." In the common law system, the law is not something that
exists, but is in a state of becoming. Although one might judge that a
prior interpretation of the law in a specific case was correct given what
had gone before, one never knows what the law is now until the next
case is decided. This is the paradox that Lewis Caroll put in the mouth
of the White Queen: jam yesterday, jam tomorrow, but never jam
today.
The necessary truth of right is that every application is
subjective, particular and contingent. Application requires the judge to
forget for a moment and aet as though his opinion were faet, and his
judgment objective. He must repress the nature of right in order to
actualize right, even as this repression, as a semblance, is always wrong.

91 One of us has used this passage to illustrate the Hegelian concept of sublation, and the
impossibility of drawing clear borders in the law. Schroeder, Never Jam To-day, supra note 44.
Unfortunately, we did not realize at the time that Carroll's joke was not intended merely as an
illustration of a certain logical paradox, but a clever Latin pun. Latin has two words for the
English word "now". Nunc and iam (which can, altematively, be spelled jam). The former is
only used in the present tense, while the latter is only used in the past and future tenses.
Consequently, from a grammarian's point of view iam is only permissible yesterday and
tomorrow, but not today. MARTIN GARDNER, THE ANNOTATED ALICE (Rev. ed. 2000).
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Metaphor and Metonymy

A legal opinion is a metaphor, but right is a metonym. Metaphor
and metonymy are important terms in Lacan's theory of language. Law
is, of course, located in the order of the symbolic. Consequently, an
explanation of om hypothesis as to masculine nature of judging needs to
make some reference to Lacanian linguistics.
Lacan describes language as a matter of signification, whereby a
signifier refers to a signified. Signification, however, must be
distinguished from meaning—^the simple correspondence of language
(signifiers) to pre-existing notions or reality. Meaning is the hallmark
of the imaginary. The imaginary is the realm of simple mirror images,
negation, correspondence and picture thinking that we associate with
common sense. Meaning represents the myth that we can have direct,
unmediated, uninterpreted knowledge of the world outside of the
symbolic. It assumes direct correspondence between signifier and
signified. In language, however, the very fact that signification is
divided between a signifier and a signified indicates that such direct
contact has been lost. Modifying Saussure's symbols, Lacan expresses
language as the matheme S/s.^' The signifier (represented by the big S)
is not only above the signified (the small s), it is forever barred from the
signified.^^
Signification concentrates on the signifier, not the signified.
There is no direct contact with the signified in the symbolic order.
Indeed, "the barrier separating the Symbolic from the Real is impossible
to trespass, since the Symbolic is this very barrier."^^ ]qo signifier can,
therefore, refer directly to the object world. Instead, each signified is
itself another signifier. Each signification merely points to another
91 JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS: A SELECTION 149 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977):
Lacan reverses Saussure's formula, signified/signifier, giving primacy to the material
element (the signifier) in the genesis of the concept (the signified). His own formula
for the sign is thus 'S/s', 'which is read as: the signifier over the signified, "over"
corresponding to the bar separating the two stages." The signifier is granted priority
because, in Lacan's understanding, the signified is in fact simply another signifier
occupying a different position, a position 'below the bar' within signification. . . .

ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 94 (1990).
Sausstne also meant for the bar to indicate the arbitrary nature of the relation between the
signifier and signified ....
But Lacan stresses the importance of this "bar," conceiving it as indeed a "barrier" to
any one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified, insisting that any given
signifier refers not to any corresponding signified but rather to another signifier in a
sequence or "chain" of signifiers ....
William J. Richardson, Lacan and the Subject of Psychoanalysis, in 6 INTERPRETING LACAN 51,
54 (Joseph Smith & William Kerrigan eds., 1983).

92 SLAVOJ ZI2EK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL
FACTOR 201 (1991).
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signification ad infinitum?^ With no "real" ground, language is always
in a constant state of flux, with signifiers unendingly moving over an
infinite stream of signifieds which themselves are signifiers referring to
signifieds, etc.^''
The two operations by which signifiers are contingently linked to
signifieds are metaphor and metonymy.^^
jg ^j^g masculine
trope which is necessary for judgment, while the second is the feminine,
that enables the possibility of freedom and right.
Metaphor is the substitution of one word for another.^6 It is the
imaginary attempt to turn signification into meaning.^'^ It is the fiction
that we can freeze meaning, create a quilting point^^ between the upper
level of signifier and the lower level of signified and sew them together
in some permanent fashion so that the one becomes equivalent to the
other. Metaphor is an attempt to cross the mediating bar that separates
signifier and signified in order in pursuit of the dream of erotic
immediacy.99 This operation is masculine because it denies castration.
Castration is the loss of immediate relation. Metaphor, in contrast, is
the statement that there is an immediate relation between a signifier and
signified. A metaphor is the claim to have "it"—in this case
"meaning"—^that would cure the wound of castration.
Metonymy is the substitution of word for mere word, of slidings

93 "One cannot go further along this line of thought than to demonstrate that no signification
can be sustained other than by reference to another signification. . .
LAGAN, ECRITS, supra
note 91, at 150.

94 "We are forced, then, to accept the notion of an incessant sliding of the signified under the
signifier . . . ." Id. at 154. Lacan compares the unending chain of signification to "rings of a
necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings." Id. at 153.
95 Id. at 156-58. Lacan identifies metaphor and metonymy with Freud's concepts of
condensation and displacement, respectively. Id. at 160.
96 Id. at 157.
97 "Metaphor presupposes that a meaning is the dominant datum and that it deflects,
commands, the use of the signifier to sueh an extent that the entire species of preestablished, I
should say lexical, connections comes undone." JACQUES LAGAN, THE SEMINAR OF JAGQUES
LAGAN. BOOK III: THE PSYCHOSES 1955-56, at 218 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. Russell Grigg
trans., 1993).
98 Lacan calls the temporary freezing of signification by attaching the sliding of signified's
under signifier's as a "'point de capiton." LAGAN, EGRITS, supra note 91, at 154. The P.ngikh
version of EGRITS translates this as "anchoring points" although it more exactly means
"upholstery button." Zizek, emphasizing Lacan's metaphor of sewing, suggests "suture" or
"quilting point" as appropriate English equivalents. See, e.g., ZI2EK, supra note 92, at 18-19. In
Zizek's work, the quilting point refers not merely to the moment of signification, but the idee fixe,
or central idea that an individual or society adopts to give his or itself meaning and structure.
Anti-semitism is a classic example of such a quilting point.
99
The formula for metaphor contains an addition sign: +. Lacan writes of this "the -I- sign
. . here manifesting the crossing of the bar" . . . The "bar" is always represented in
Lacan's notations as a horizontal line; it is therefore "crossed" by the vertical line in
the -I- sign.
JANE GALLOP, READING LAGAN, 119 (1985) (citations omitted).
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of meaning below and above the bar of signification,
In metaphor,
the signifier stands for the signified. In metonymy, the signifier stands
by the signified. It implies that one cannot freeze or capture the essence
of meaning. Consequently, it is the attempt to invoke indirectly that
which cannot be captured directly. In metonymy one describes parts of
the signified, or that which surrounds or accompanies it, or the traces of
its retreat. Metonymy is feminine, therefore, in that it is the acceptance
of the inevitability of castration, the understanding that the real can
never be captured. It reflects the fact that we only retroactively
hypothesize the existence of the real by its traces—our sense that there
is something walled off from the symbolic order itself.'®'
A verdict resolving conflicting claims in favor of the "right" one
is metaphor. It is the freezing of the relationship between the signifier
of the particular claim and the signified of universal right. Of course,
the truth of metaphor is partial at best. Even though a metaphor asserts
some essential similarity between the signifier and the signified,
"likeness" always implies that the signifier is never identical with the
signified. The assertion of sameness is therefore always partially false.
Similarly, a judicial decision that a claim is "right" is true, because by
enforcing the claim, the judge is making it objective, universal and
necessary in the sense that other claimants must recognize it or be
punished. However, insofar as the determination implies that the claim
is universal, not just particular, it is false and hence a wrong.'®2
Metonymy, in contrast, is the recognition that the bar forever
separates the two registers of signification. It is the realization that right
can never be permanently captured, but is only a process in a constant
state of change. As is the case of metaphor, the truth of metonymy is
partial but for a different reason than with metaphor. Metaphor
juxtaposes a true and a false affirmative assertion in the same statement.
In contrast, metonymy is a true but partial and negative assertion. As
one of us has written elsewhere:
Consequently, neither metaphor and metonymy can take the stand as
witness without perjuring itself. Metaphor can "swear to tell the
tmth, the whole truth" hut would lie if it implied that it also tells
"nothing but the truth." In contrast, metonymy can "swear to tell the
tmth . . . and nothing but the tmth" but is unable to promise to tell
"the whole tmth." Both metaphor and metonymy are always in
violation of the federal securities laws which makes it unlawful "to
'00 LAGAN, ECRITS, supra note 91, at 157.
101 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three's a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and
Melamed's One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394 (1999).
102 See Robert M. Cover, Nomas and Narrative, 92 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) ("The unification
of meaning that stands at its center exists only for an instant, and that instant is itself
imaginary.").
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make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading." Metaphor always makes material misstatements and
metonymy always makes material omissions.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have argued that the appearance of right is the
essence of wrong. Any legal claim is a claim to meaning. As such it
suppresses the feminine—subjectivity itself, and hence is wrong. What
is right is the very failure of a legal claim. When such a mediate fades
away, right has manifested itself. Right is a metonym and can never be
captured entirely in symbolic order.

103 SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, supra note 83 (footnotes omitted).

